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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the changes in profitability in the U.S. banking industry during the 
continuing consolidation since Riegle-Neal became fully effective.  It presents information on the 
changes in profitability in the U.S. banking industry to determine whether or not the trends 
observed in the immediate aftermath of Riegle-Neal have continued. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he McFadden Act of 1927 and other legislation restricted the ability of U.S. banks to engage in 
interstate banking and branching.  The Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
removed these restrictions by allowing banks to request regulatory approval for mergers across state 
lines.  Section 44, a) 1) stated that beginning on June 1, 1997 interstate mergers could be approved.  Section 44, a) 3) 
indicated that such mergers could be approved before June 1, 1997 if the home states of each bank involved in the 
merger approved interstate banking merger transactions with all out of state banks.  This was expected to accelerate 
the trend toward consolidation which was already taking place in the U.S. banking industry. 
 
In previous research Matasar and Heiney (2002) studied the immediate effects of the deregulation instituted 
by Riegle Neal.  They examined the effects of the act on consolidation in the U.S. banking industry in terms of the 
number of banking institutions, merger and acquisition activity, the number of de novo banks, the number of bank 
failures, and the number of bank branches.  In addition, they studied the impact on asset size distribution, bank 
profitability, the availability of service and the level of fees, and employment and compensation in the industry. 
 
Since Riegle-Neal was passed in 1994 and became fully effective in 1997, Matasar and Heiney examined 
data from 1990 to 1998 to capture the initial impact of the act by looking at the period from before the act was 
passed to immediately after the act became fully effective.  They indicated that: 
 
This study of Riegle-Neal may appear somewhat premature or preliminary because of the short period of time since 
the law was enacted and fully enforceable.  Nonetheless the findings herein reveal the direction that changes 
associated with the law are likely to take and thus serve as a base-line for future analysis. 
 
The snowball of change in the banking community continues to roll and pick up speed even as this book is being 
written.  What is being presented here, therefore, is a still photo of a moment in time, as well as comparison with the 
past.  The future of banking and of financial services in the 21
st
 century is likely to differ considerably from what it 
was at the end of the 20
th
 century.  Hopefully this book offers a foundation for further thought and understanding of 
the future now being considered.  (Matasar and Heiney, 2002, p. viii.) 
 
This paper examines the changes in profitability in the U.S. banking industry during the continuing 
consolidation since Riegle-Neal became fully effective.  It presents information on the changes in profitability in the 
U.S. banking industry  to determine whether or not the trends observed in the immediate aftermath of Riegle-Neal 
have continued. 
 
 
T 
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THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONSOLIDATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
When Riegle-Neal eliminated the restrictions on interstate banking and branching activity, it was expected 
that newly available merger and acquisition opportunities across state lines would accelerate the consolidation 
among U.S. banks already underway.  There were concerns regarding the resulting impact on the level of bank 
services and fees and on employment in the industry.  Rose (1997) presents a thorough examination of the possible 
consequences of the increased consolidation resulting from increased interstate banking. 
 
One reason to expect increased merger activity was the opportunity to take advantage of economies of 
scale.  A merger can be a less costly way to achieve efficient asset size than internal expansion.  Calem (1994) 
indicates that there are economies of scale in the banking industry up to an asset size of $75 million.  Economies of 
scale seem to run out for banks with assets between $75 and $300 million.  Beyond $300 million in assets, 
diseconomies of scale seem to set in.   
 
Merger activity may also be a mechanism to replace inefficient management.  Calomiris and Karceski 
(1998) ask, “Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?”  The economic analysis of government regulation 
often argues that regulation has the effect of protecting less efficient firms from competition by more efficient firms.  
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) present a political economy model in which it is argued that federal 
branching restrictions were designed to protect smaller, less efficient banks from larger, more efficient banks.  
Jayaratne and  Strahan (1998) also examine the relationship between entry restrictions and efficiency for commercial 
banks. 
 
It can also be argued that the interstate mergers newly allowed by Riegle-Neal provided an opportunity for 
banks to reduce risk through geographic diversification.  The extent to which geographic diversification reduces risk 
for an institution depends on the correlation of economic conditions in different areas of the country.  If economic 
conditions are very highly positively correlated across regions of the country, then geographic expansion through 
interstate banking and branching will not contribute significantly to the objective of risk reduction.  Carlino and Sill 
(2000) find that the correlation coefficients for real per capita personal income across the regions of the U.S. are 
typically above 0.88.  The far west region is an exception for which correlation coefficients with the other seven 
regions are between 0.20 and 0.32.  Sherwood-Cali (1990) examines the economic stability of different regions of 
the country in terms of state industry diversification.  She finds that the reduction of volatility due to industry 
diversification provides the opportunity of risk reduction through geographic expansion of financial institutions. 
 
Smoluk, Andrews, and Voyer (2003) provide a methodology for examining the “potential benefits of risk 
reduction for financial institutions wishing to grow primarily through a strategy of geographic expansion.” (p. 47)  
They find that “by strategically investing in different regions, a financial institution could reduce its potential 
earnings risk by over 58 percent while maintaining or improving potential profitability.” (p. 48) 
 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY: 1990 – 1998 
 
Between 1990 and 1998 the number of banking institutions in the U.S. decreased by 3,288 or 26.7% from 
12,303 to 9,015.  The change in the number of banking institutions is determined by the number of mergers and 
acquisitions, the number of bank failures, and the number of new banks formed.  This decrease in the number of 
banks was primarily due to merger and acquisition activity during this period.  From 1990 to 1998 there were 4,944 
banking mergers.  During this period there were only 70 bank failures.  Therefore, mergers and failures would have 
resulted in a decrease in the number of banks of 5,014.  The fact that the number of banking institutions decreased 
by less than this amount is due to the 1,071 de novo banks which began operation in this period.  Furthermore, the 
effect of the decreasing number of institutions on the availability of service was ameliorated by an increase in the 
number of bank branches by 13,396 from 49,848 to 63,244.  (Matasar and Heiney, 2002) 
 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY SINCE RIEGLE-NEAL: 1998 – 2004 
 
Table One presents information on the number of commercial banks and the percentage changes in the 
number of commercial banks from 1993 to 2004.  These data are slightly different from those reported in Matasar 
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and Heiney (2002) because they come from a different FDIC report, and the data reported above for 1990 to 1998 
did not include the District of Columbia.  In Table One the number of banking institutions decreased from 11,463 to 
8,774 between 1992 and 1998.  The number of banking institutions was decreasing at a rate of over 4% per year 
during this period. Between 1999 and 2004 the number of banking institutions decreased from 8,580 to 7,630.  In 
percentage terms, this represents a rate of decrease of only about 1.5% to just over 3% per year.  It appears that the 
rate of consolidation has slowed since the initial impact of Riegle-Neal. 
 
 
Table One 
Number of Banks and 
Percent Change Number of Banks 
Year Number of Banks 
Percent Change 
Number of Banks 
1992 11,463  
1993 10,959 -4.397 
1994 10,452 -4.626 
1995 9,941 -4.889 
1996 9,528 -4.154 
1997 9,143 -4.041 
1998 8,774 -4.036 
1999 8,580 -2.221 
2000 8,315 -3.089 
2001 8,080 -2.826 
2001 7,888 -2.376 
2003 7,770 -1.496 
2004 7,630 -1.802 
Source:  FDIC, Statistics on Banking 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND PROFITABILITY IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY: 1996-1998 
 
 Profitability can be measured in a variety of ways.  Data from the FDIC, including return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity(ROE), percent of unprofitable institutions, and percent of institutions with earnings gains, will be 
used here to examine the relationship between consolidation and profitability.  Matasar and Heiney (2002) made the 
following findings in their study of the initial impact of Reigle-Neal. 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Nationally, the ROA rose from 1996 to 1999 by 10.08% despite the increase of 1.60% in the credit-loss provision to 
net charge-offs and an increment of 5.17% in net charge-offs to loans and leases.  (p. 29) 
 
Return on Equity 
 
The national banking industry posted a gain of 6.16% in the composite ROE from 1996 to 1999.  Half the states 
recorded expanded ROEs among their banks, whereas the other half had ROEs that contracted.  (p. 29) 
 
Percent of Unprofitable Institutions 
 
Most disconcerting was the extremely large increase, 68%, in the number of unprofitable banking institutions during 
the period 1996-1999.  In the final analysis, this was a most telling figure because it clearly demonstrated that the 
period of banking consolidation had either injured or been unable to save a substantial portion of the industry 
members experiencing financial difficulties.  The anticipated benefits of cross-border mergers and acquisitions are 
brought into question by this finding.  (p. 29) 
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Percent of Institutions with Earnings Gains 
 
The national decline of -10.82% in the number of banking institutions with earnings gains augments the findings 
related to the growth in the unprofitable institutions.  Nonetheless there is no definitive pattern between these two 
factors among the individual states.  (p. 30) 
 
Profitability or asset utilization ratios collectively reflect a mixed message for end of the 1990s and provide a basis 
for uncertainty for looking toward the future.  Although giving little credence to those projecting doom and gloom 
for the banking industry because of geographic expansion, the generally poor profitability performance of the 
nation’s banks as a group must be viewed as discouraging.  (p. 30) 
 
 
Table Two 
Measures of Profitability 
Year 
Return 
On Assets 
Return 
On Equity 
Percent of 
Unprofitable 
Institutions 
Percent of 
Institutions With 
Earnings Gains 
2000 1.18 13.99 7.34 67.31 
2001 1.16 13.15 8.13 56.27 
2001 1.33 14.46 6.64 72.64 
2003 1.40 15.31 6.01 59.20 
2004 1.30 13.72 5.87 64.83 
2005 1.33 13.26 6.31 66.01 
Percent Change 12.71 -5.22 -14.03 -1.93 
Source:  FDIC, Statistics on Banking 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND PROFITABILITY IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY  
SINCE RIEGLE-NEAL: 1999-2004 
 
 Table Two presents data from the FDIC on these four measures of profitability for the 2000-2005 to 
examine the period after Riegle-Neal became fully effective.   
 
Return on Assets 
 
 For the U.S. banking industry as a whole ROA increased from 1.18 in 2000 to 1.40  in 2003, after which it 
decreased again to 1.33 in 2005.  For the period 2000 to 2005 therefore ROA in the U.S. banking industry increased 
by 12.71%.  Compared to the period 1996-1999 when the immediate impact of Riegle-Neal saw an increase in ROA 
of 10.08%, the subsequent period since Riegle-Neal has seen an even greater increase in ROA of 12.71%.  By this 
measure then profitability in the U.S. banking industry has increased as consolidation has continued at a somewhat 
slower pace. 
 
Return on Equity 
 
 As in the case of ROA, the period since Riegle-Neal was one in which ROE increased from 2000 to 2003, 
from 13.99 to 15.31, after which it decreased again to 13.26 in 2005.   In this case, however, for the five year period 
as a whole there was a decrease in ROE of 5.22%.  Unlike the period 1996-1999 when the immediate impact of 
Riegle-Neal was an increase in ROE of 6.16%, the subsequent period of continuing consolidation since Riegle-Neal 
has seen a decrease in profitability as measured by ROE. 
 
Percent of Unprofitable Institutions 
 
 During the period 1996-1999 in the immediate aftermath of Riegle-Neal the percent of unprofitable 
institutions increase 68%.  However, Table Three indicates that in the period since then from 2000 to 2005 the 
percent of unprofitable institutions decreased by 14.03%.  If, as suggested above, one motive for merger activity is 
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to replace inefficient management, then this finding of a decrease in the percent of unprofitable institutions is not 
surprising as more efficient banks buy out less efficient banks returning them to profitability. 
 
Percent of Institutions with Earnings Gains 
 
 From 1996 to 1999 the percent of institutions with earnings gains decreased by 10.82% nationally.  In the 
subsequent period from 2000 to 2005 the percent of institutions with earnings gains continued to decrease, but only 
by 1.93%.  The percent of unprofitable institutions and the percent of institutions with earnings gains together 
indicate that in the period of continuing consolidation since Riegle-Neal, a larger percent of U.S. banks are 
profitable, but the percent whose profitability is increasing is smaller. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has extended previous research which studied the initial impact of the Riegle-Neal Act on 
consolidation and profitability in the U.S. banking industry by examining the period of time since this deregulation 
became fully effective to see if the immediate effects set in motion by the passage of the act have continued or 
moderated. 
 
The data on the number of banking institutions indicate that the number of institutions continues to 
decrease.  However, the rate at which the number of banks is decreasing has slowed since Riegle-Neal became fully 
effective.   
 
The information on profitability presented here indicates that profitability as measured by ROA has 
increased, but measured by ROE it has decreased slightly.  The percent of U.S. banks which are unprofitable has 
decreased in the more recent period compared to the increase immediately after Riegle-Neal.  The percent of 
institutions for which earnings are increasing has seen a decline, but to a significantly smaller extent than the earlier 
period. 
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